Washington Update, Comfort Women & Reconciliation
May 9, 2007
Japanese PM Shinzo Abe visited Washington recently (April 26-27). Whereas nothing untoward happened, nothing much of substance happened either. If there was a theme, it was how much the Abe and Bush Administrations want to ignore the history and reconciliation issues. This is in growing contrast to the rest of official Washington--Congress, think tanks, journalists, government analysts—who now recognize “history” and Japan’s conservatives as impediments to a “robust” American security policy in Asia.
The Comfort Women Resolution (H.Res.121, the Resolution) has done much to spotlight these issues and trends. Once a simple response to Korean-American constituent concerns, the Resolution has evolved into a cause for a number of major American political communities, such as human rights, UN, women’s rights, international law and Asian American. Most important, the Resolution now focuses attention on the nature of conservatism among Japan’s political class and the potential dangers of allying with these sorts of leaders.
It is unusual for an unbinding, constituent-focused resolution—there are hundreds of these legislative initiatives each year—to become so important. Why did this happen and why is it now the focal point for all discussions of history and reconciliation with Japan? The simple answer is that Japan made it so. Through bad advice, a lack of understanding of the American political process, and sheer arrogance Tokyo managed to headline the Comfort Women issue and Japan’s related failure of historical reconciliation in Asia. The more complex answer has to do with Bush Administration foreign policy and its many failures. And inherent in both explanations, timing was everything.
As I reported in this blog last year, the GoJ made a serious strategic mistake by sending former Congressman Bob Michels to have a drink with Speaker of the House Dennis Hastert at the Capitol Hill Club thus persuading him kill last year’s Comfort Women (CW) resolution by not scheduling it for a floor vote. At the time, the end of 109th Congress, the CW resolution could have passed under suspension (no debate and no roll call) quietly in the dead of night. The issue would have been laid to rest and never heard from again. HIRC Chairman Henry Hyde (R-IL) had wanted it as a “gift” to his dying friend and fellow veteran, Rep Lane Evans (D-IL). The resolution was something Evans, a respected advocate of human rights, had wanted, few would have disputed.
After the Congressional elections, the debt to Mr. Evans remained and his other congressional friends sought to take up his cause and try to deliver Hyde’s “gift.” Japanese-American Congressman Honda who comes from a district with large Asian American and human rights constituencies decided to spearhead the effort. He was also the head of the Asian and Pacific American Caucus. The Japanese American community has always had a peculiar relationship with its mother country. Indeed, like most Americans, they do not necessarily remember fondly the family experience back in the old country and they particularly resent being identified with its missteps. Rep Honda had been a leading advocate the successful effort a US government apology and reparation to interned Japanese Americans. Honda, himself, was born in an internment camp.
To his credit, Mr. Honda made an early decision to first contact scholars, especially those outside of the Korean American community, for their input into reintroducing the resolution. Leading Japan scholars in the US and Japan knowledgeable about Japanese politics and history all had opportunities to review a draft resolution and make suggestions. The result was an emphasis on “responsibility” and “unequivocal” as well as praise for what Japan had already done. The resolution was also more tightly written with much of it a direct response to the carefully hedged changes the Embassy of Japan had tried to insert in the previous resolution. It should be noted that throughout the process, Japan and its representatives worked on the assumption that no one would understand the Japan political system or history well enough to question their statements or suggestions.
The new Democratic Congress also has no vested interest in defending any Bush foreign policy initiatives. They do have a strong interest in human rights and women’s right. The Congress, voted in as a protest to aggressive Republican foreign policies, has a natural commitment to the rule of law and all efforts toward reconciliation. The Comfort Women issue appealed to this liberal Congress and tapped the growing political activism of the Asian-American community. In addition, 2006 saw a number of important think tank initiatives to study the continuing history issues Japan had with its neighbors, especially China and Korea. Many congressional staffers and Asia hands in Washington were involved and thus current on the political dynamics of history in Asia.
After Rep Honda introduced the Resolution, the Embassy of Japan pursued an extremely aggressive lobbying campaign. Members were inundated with lobbyist visits and briefs outlining how many apologies had been given by Japan and Japanese PMs on the CW issue. The focus was on the Kono Statement and the letters the PMs signed to the women who were willing to accept payments from the Asian Women’s Fund. You can find a version of these lobbying documents on the Embassy of Japan’s homepage (http://www.us.emb-japan.go.jp/english/html/cw1.htm). A careful review of the “apologies” listed, however, shows that none could be considered an official governmental apology.
So surprisingly insistent were the lobbyists for Japan that members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee (HFAC, the HIRC was returned to its original name, HFAC by the Democrats) became suspicious of all the attention. The head of HFAC subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, Rep Eni Faleomavaega, consequently felt he did not have the full story. He, therefore, insisted upon a hearing and one quickly. He gave his staff only two weeks to organize one even though he was told that the healthiest living survivors were in Asia and very elderly.
After some fretting and much worry over the ability of these women to make the trip, the three women were invited to Washington: two from Korea and one from Australia. As some know, the US Congress does not pay for its witnesses to come to Washington. Fundraising to cover the travel costs of these women is still ongoing.
Although few congressmen/women attended the hearing, the women’s testimonies had a tremendous impact. Accounts of the hearing spread quickly as there was not a dry eye in the audience and one Korean CW broke congressional protocol by insisting that a missing congressman return and face her. One fact that the Embassy of Japan lobbyists neglected is that many senior staffers and chiefs of staff in Congress are women. In talking to some of these very tough and politically savvy women after the hearing, I found that each empathized with the Dutch woman as she described the Samurai sword running across her body, naked from having had her clothes ripped off by the Japanese officer, before she was brutally raped for her "first time." None could answer how she would have reacted in the same situation.
The hearing also laid out the framework for a resolution of the CW issue and what constitutes the official apology that the CW never felt they received. I suspect that the lobbyists and "friends" of Japan in the lead up to the hearing advised the Embassy that no one would have any substantive testimony. It was be all emotional rants about injustice. Everyone, observers and press, all cleared out of the room when my time to testify came. Left were Reps Honda and Faleomavaega and their staff. Thus, it took a while for Japan to realize that my testimony was substantive, historical, and legal. In fact, it appears that my testimony was ignored by the Embassy and Kantei as it has never been commented on nor disputed. Japan continues to focus on the number of apologies made without note of their quality, substance, or legal standing.
During his Washington visit, PM Abe was invited to a private meeting with some of the Congressional leadership, which had been arranged by Senator Daniel Inouye. The Senator was opposed to the CW resolution and wrote a letter to the House leadership outlining his concerns. The letter noted the list of apologies provided by the Japanese Embassy (which include many that made no direct mention of CW) and added that the Senator thought that the Resolution would harm US-Japan relations. It is highly unusual for a Senator to counsel members of the House on legislation over which the Senate has no jurisdiction.
PM Abe traveled to the chambers of House Speaker Nancy Pelosi for a 45 minute discussion. Without being asked, he told those assembled that he “I heartily sympathize, as a person and as the Prime Minister, with the former comfort women who underwent hardships/privations; I am filled with the feeling of being sorry for [the fact] that they were put into extremely severe conditions/situation.” Abe’s interpreter actually used the expression “sense of being sorry.” No one in the room understood what that meant other than it was not the apology they were waiting to hear. Senator Inouye ran damage control and added that Japan had apologized enough and that he was embarrassed that this issue had come up so many times in the House.
If that statement did not confuse those present, then the joint press conference further puzzled Congress. Here PM Abe gave another "apology" for the CW and President Bush responded that he accepted the PM’s apology:
PRESIDENT BUSH: The comfort women issue is a regrettable chapter in the history of the world, and I accept the Prime Minister's apology. I thought it was very -- I thought his statements -- Kono's statement, as well as statements here in the United States were very straightforward and from his heart. And I'm looking forward to working with this man to lead our nations forward. And that's what we spent time discussing today.
We had a personal visit on the issue. He gave his -- he told me what was on his heart about the issue, and I appreciated his candor. And our jobs are to, obviously, learn lessons from the past. All of us need to learn lessons from the past and lead our nations forward. That's what the Prime Minister is doing in a very capable way. (http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/04/20070427-6.html)
To members of Congress and other observers, they again did not hear the world apology and could not fathom why the President would accept an apology for something that had nothing to do with him. Congressional bewilderment was further compounded when they learned that Abe, hoping to appease his conservative constituency, had the MOFA spokesman clearly state and confirm that he had not made an apology regarding the CW while in Washington:
MR. TANIGUCHI: I do not think he apologized. He tried hard to explain what he has long been saying about the very issue of comfort women, and that is what actually happened. So, describing it as that Prime Minister Abe tried to apologize to the members of Congress I think is not an accurate description.” (http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/press/2007/4/0427.html )
The Bush-Abe summit is said to have gone well. The two declared that the US-Japan alliance was solid and “irreplaceable. Washington's number one Japan guru, CSIS Japan Chair Mike Green noted, “There were three objectives for the prime minister's visit to the United States. Just like former Prime Minister Koizumi, he wanted to cultivate friendship with President Bush, to have the US administration take a hard line toward North Korea, and to settle the comfort women issue. The prime minister fulfilled all of his objectives.” Green added, “as for the issue of the comfort women, the President expressly said, "I accept the prime minister's apologies," and he publicly suggested his support of Prime Minister Abe. For the prime minister, he won the US administration to 'his side'.”
Although it is hard to imagine that the MOFA spokesman's clarification of the nonapology was not an embarrassment to the Bush Administration, the Bush-Abe Summit was considered a success. Yet, when PM Abe arrived in the US on April 26th there were 92 co-sponsors of CW Resolution. Today, May 10th, there are 117.
I hope to write another update shortly.
Japanese PM Shinzo Abe visited Washington recently (April 26-27). Whereas nothing untoward happened, nothing much of substance happened either. If there was a theme, it was how much the Abe and Bush Administrations want to ignore the history and reconciliation issues. This is in growing contrast to the rest of official Washington--Congress, think tanks, journalists, government analysts—who now recognize “history” and Japan’s conservatives as impediments to a “robust” American security policy in Asia.
The Comfort Women Resolution (H.Res.121, the Resolution) has done much to spotlight these issues and trends. Once a simple response to Korean-American constituent concerns, the Resolution has evolved into a cause for a number of major American political communities, such as human rights, UN, women’s rights, international law and Asian American. Most important, the Resolution now focuses attention on the nature of conservatism among Japan’s political class and the potential dangers of allying with these sorts of leaders.
It is unusual for an unbinding, constituent-focused resolution—there are hundreds of these legislative initiatives each year—to become so important. Why did this happen and why is it now the focal point for all discussions of history and reconciliation with Japan? The simple answer is that Japan made it so. Through bad advice, a lack of understanding of the American political process, and sheer arrogance Tokyo managed to headline the Comfort Women issue and Japan’s related failure of historical reconciliation in Asia. The more complex answer has to do with Bush Administration foreign policy and its many failures. And inherent in both explanations, timing was everything.
As I reported in this blog last year, the GoJ made a serious strategic mistake by sending former Congressman Bob Michels to have a drink with Speaker of the House Dennis Hastert at the Capitol Hill Club thus persuading him kill last year’s Comfort Women (CW) resolution by not scheduling it for a floor vote. At the time, the end of 109th Congress, the CW resolution could have passed under suspension (no debate and no roll call) quietly in the dead of night. The issue would have been laid to rest and never heard from again. HIRC Chairman Henry Hyde (R-IL) had wanted it as a “gift” to his dying friend and fellow veteran, Rep Lane Evans (D-IL). The resolution was something Evans, a respected advocate of human rights, had wanted, few would have disputed.
After the Congressional elections, the debt to Mr. Evans remained and his other congressional friends sought to take up his cause and try to deliver Hyde’s “gift.” Japanese-American Congressman Honda who comes from a district with large Asian American and human rights constituencies decided to spearhead the effort. He was also the head of the Asian and Pacific American Caucus. The Japanese American community has always had a peculiar relationship with its mother country. Indeed, like most Americans, they do not necessarily remember fondly the family experience back in the old country and they particularly resent being identified with its missteps. Rep Honda had been a leading advocate the successful effort a US government apology and reparation to interned Japanese Americans. Honda, himself, was born in an internment camp.
To his credit, Mr. Honda made an early decision to first contact scholars, especially those outside of the Korean American community, for their input into reintroducing the resolution. Leading Japan scholars in the US and Japan knowledgeable about Japanese politics and history all had opportunities to review a draft resolution and make suggestions. The result was an emphasis on “responsibility” and “unequivocal” as well as praise for what Japan had already done. The resolution was also more tightly written with much of it a direct response to the carefully hedged changes the Embassy of Japan had tried to insert in the previous resolution. It should be noted that throughout the process, Japan and its representatives worked on the assumption that no one would understand the Japan political system or history well enough to question their statements or suggestions.
The new Democratic Congress also has no vested interest in defending any Bush foreign policy initiatives. They do have a strong interest in human rights and women’s right. The Congress, voted in as a protest to aggressive Republican foreign policies, has a natural commitment to the rule of law and all efforts toward reconciliation. The Comfort Women issue appealed to this liberal Congress and tapped the growing political activism of the Asian-American community. In addition, 2006 saw a number of important think tank initiatives to study the continuing history issues Japan had with its neighbors, especially China and Korea. Many congressional staffers and Asia hands in Washington were involved and thus current on the political dynamics of history in Asia.
After Rep Honda introduced the Resolution, the Embassy of Japan pursued an extremely aggressive lobbying campaign. Members were inundated with lobbyist visits and briefs outlining how many apologies had been given by Japan and Japanese PMs on the CW issue. The focus was on the Kono Statement and the letters the PMs signed to the women who were willing to accept payments from the Asian Women’s Fund. You can find a version of these lobbying documents on the Embassy of Japan’s homepage (http://www.us.emb-japan.go.jp/english/html/cw1.htm). A careful review of the “apologies” listed, however, shows that none could be considered an official governmental apology.
So surprisingly insistent were the lobbyists for Japan that members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee (HFAC, the HIRC was returned to its original name, HFAC by the Democrats) became suspicious of all the attention. The head of HFAC subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, Rep Eni Faleomavaega, consequently felt he did not have the full story. He, therefore, insisted upon a hearing and one quickly. He gave his staff only two weeks to organize one even though he was told that the healthiest living survivors were in Asia and very elderly.
After some fretting and much worry over the ability of these women to make the trip, the three women were invited to Washington: two from Korea and one from Australia. As some know, the US Congress does not pay for its witnesses to come to Washington. Fundraising to cover the travel costs of these women is still ongoing.
Although few congressmen/women attended the hearing, the women’s testimonies had a tremendous impact. Accounts of the hearing spread quickly as there was not a dry eye in the audience and one Korean CW broke congressional protocol by insisting that a missing congressman return and face her. One fact that the Embassy of Japan lobbyists neglected is that many senior staffers and chiefs of staff in Congress are women. In talking to some of these very tough and politically savvy women after the hearing, I found that each empathized with the Dutch woman as she described the Samurai sword running across her body, naked from having had her clothes ripped off by the Japanese officer, before she was brutally raped for her "first time." None could answer how she would have reacted in the same situation.
The hearing also laid out the framework for a resolution of the CW issue and what constitutes the official apology that the CW never felt they received. I suspect that the lobbyists and "friends" of Japan in the lead up to the hearing advised the Embassy that no one would have any substantive testimony. It was be all emotional rants about injustice. Everyone, observers and press, all cleared out of the room when my time to testify came. Left were Reps Honda and Faleomavaega and their staff. Thus, it took a while for Japan to realize that my testimony was substantive, historical, and legal. In fact, it appears that my testimony was ignored by the Embassy and Kantei as it has never been commented on nor disputed. Japan continues to focus on the number of apologies made without note of their quality, substance, or legal standing.
During his Washington visit, PM Abe was invited to a private meeting with some of the Congressional leadership, which had been arranged by Senator Daniel Inouye. The Senator was opposed to the CW resolution and wrote a letter to the House leadership outlining his concerns. The letter noted the list of apologies provided by the Japanese Embassy (which include many that made no direct mention of CW) and added that the Senator thought that the Resolution would harm US-Japan relations. It is highly unusual for a Senator to counsel members of the House on legislation over which the Senate has no jurisdiction.
PM Abe traveled to the chambers of House Speaker Nancy Pelosi for a 45 minute discussion. Without being asked, he told those assembled that he “I heartily sympathize, as a person and as the Prime Minister, with the former comfort women who underwent hardships/privations; I am filled with the feeling of being sorry for [the fact] that they were put into extremely severe conditions/situation.” Abe’s interpreter actually used the expression “sense of being sorry.” No one in the room understood what that meant other than it was not the apology they were waiting to hear. Senator Inouye ran damage control and added that Japan had apologized enough and that he was embarrassed that this issue had come up so many times in the House.
If that statement did not confuse those present, then the joint press conference further puzzled Congress. Here PM Abe gave another "apology" for the CW and President Bush responded that he accepted the PM’s apology:
PRESIDENT BUSH: The comfort women issue is a regrettable chapter in the history of the world, and I accept the Prime Minister's apology. I thought it was very -- I thought his statements -- Kono's statement, as well as statements here in the United States were very straightforward and from his heart. And I'm looking forward to working with this man to lead our nations forward. And that's what we spent time discussing today.
We had a personal visit on the issue. He gave his -- he told me what was on his heart about the issue, and I appreciated his candor. And our jobs are to, obviously, learn lessons from the past. All of us need to learn lessons from the past and lead our nations forward. That's what the Prime Minister is doing in a very capable way. (http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/04/20070427-6.html)
To members of Congress and other observers, they again did not hear the world apology and could not fathom why the President would accept an apology for something that had nothing to do with him. Congressional bewilderment was further compounded when they learned that Abe, hoping to appease his conservative constituency, had the MOFA spokesman clearly state and confirm that he had not made an apology regarding the CW while in Washington:
MR. TANIGUCHI: I do not think he apologized. He tried hard to explain what he has long been saying about the very issue of comfort women, and that is what actually happened. So, describing it as that Prime Minister Abe tried to apologize to the members of Congress I think is not an accurate description.” (http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/press/2007/4/0427.html )
The Bush-Abe summit is said to have gone well. The two declared that the US-Japan alliance was solid and “irreplaceable. Washington's number one Japan guru, CSIS Japan Chair Mike Green noted, “There were three objectives for the prime minister's visit to the United States. Just like former Prime Minister Koizumi, he wanted to cultivate friendship with President Bush, to have the US administration take a hard line toward North Korea, and to settle the comfort women issue. The prime minister fulfilled all of his objectives.” Green added, “as for the issue of the comfort women, the President expressly said, "I accept the prime minister's apologies," and he publicly suggested his support of Prime Minister Abe. For the prime minister, he won the US administration to 'his side'.”
Although it is hard to imagine that the MOFA spokesman's clarification of the nonapology was not an embarrassment to the Bush Administration, the Bush-Abe Summit was considered a success. Yet, when PM Abe arrived in the US on April 26th there were 92 co-sponsors of CW Resolution. Today, May 10th, there are 117.
I hope to write another update shortly.
posted by Mindy Kotler Smith at 5:52 AM
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